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E31Inﬂation and unemployment reduce welfare of individuals and should be as low as possible in any economy.
Cointegration and Granger causality tests suggest that there are long run relations between these two variables
among the OECD economies. While rates of unemployment vary signiﬁcantly among these economies, rates of
inﬂation have stabilised at lower rates as a result of inﬂation targeting policies adopted in them during the last
two decades. The Phillips curve phenomena are still empirically signiﬁcant for 28 out of 35 of these OECD econ-
omies in country speciﬁc regressions; in ﬁxed and random effect panel datamodels and in a panel VARmodel for
1990:1 to 2014:4. Country speciﬁc supply curves and Okun curves are consistent to thin Phillips curve relations.
Leftward shifts in the Beveridge and Phillips curves require labour market reforms balancing between job crea-
tions and destructions. Complementing macro stimulations by microeconomic structural and institutional
reforms can bring efﬁciency in bargaining for wages and employment among ﬁrms and workers to make unem-
ployment–inﬂation trade-offs more signiﬁcant and relevant in these economies.
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OECD1. Introduction
About 41.5 million people were unemployed across EU countries in
2014 (OECD, 2014). Economic, social and psychological costs of high
rates of unemployment, that now averages around 8.3%, are enormous.
Recessions, post-2008 ﬁnancial crises, have forced countries to adopt
expansionary and stimulating economic policies aiming to reduce
such unemployment rates. Some countries, such as Germany or the
UK or the US, have become successful in lowering the unemployment
rates bringing fundamental reforms in their labour markets. Others,
such as Spain or Italy are stuck at high rates of unemployment with
rigid labour markets. Whether or not these unemployment rates could
be stabilised towards their natural rates by stimulating the aggregate
demand through ﬁscal or monetary policies with or without some
increase in price levels is an issue widely investigated in the macroeco-
nomic literature since Keynes (1936) and particularly after Phillips
(1958). Phillips curves were integrated to the analysis of aggregate
demand and aggregate supply in macroeconomic models by Phelps
(1968); Friedman (1968); Lucas and Rapping (1969); Lucas (1976);
Brunner et al. (1976); Layard and Nickell (1986, 1990); Blanchﬂower
and Oswald (1994); Grubb (1986); Cross (1988); Hoon (2001) and
Pissarides (2013) and most recently by Blanchard (2016). Persistencyes, colleagues inHull and in the
ushanta Mallick on the earlier
ll HU6 7RX, UK.
. This is an open access article underof high unemployment rates across OECD countries during the era of
great moderation particularly after the economic crisis of 2008 and
the subsequent recessions requires a careful examination on evidences
of the Phillips curves in these economies tomeasure trade-offs between
unemployment and inﬂation.
This paper aims to investigate whether there exist any trade-offs
between unemployment and inﬂation as proclaimed by Phillips
(1958) andmanyother subsequent studies among theOECDeconomies
individually and as a group over the last two and a half decades. Almost
all of these economies have universally adopted inﬂation targeting
regimes and subsequently have opted to limit the role of demand
managements in regulating economic activities in recent years. Looking
at the quarterly data series on unemployment and inﬂation rates from
1990:1 to 2014:4 for the OECD countries, this paper ﬁnds plenty
of empirical evidences for such trade-offs. Phillips curves (also
complemented by estimations of Okun and aggregate supply curves)
are still signiﬁcant among 28 out of 35 OECD economies individually
and in the panel of 40 advanced economies. These were found more
signiﬁcant in countries such as Australia, Denmark, France, Italy,
Netherlands, Spain, New Zealand, UK and the US. This study also ﬁnds
bidirectional causality as well as cointegrating relationships between
unemployment and inﬂation. Estimates of a vector autoregression
(VAR)model on these trade-offs also support such hypothesis. Thinness
of the Phillips curve is further conﬁrmed by coefﬁcients of short run ag-
gregate supply functions thatwere signiﬁcant for only in three countries
and the coefﬁcients of Okun curve for growth on unemployment that
were signiﬁcant only in thirteen of these thirty ﬁve countries. Our ﬁnd-
ings for thinner Phillips curve relations are also consistent to a verythe CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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offs in other countries such as Austria, Germany, Israel and Norway
and positive counter-intuitive relations for Korea, Russia and Slovak Re-
public supports to the policy irrelevance propositions under the rational
expectation hypothesis (Lucas, 1973; Phelps and Taylor, 1977).
This leads us to believe that the controversy on the shape and size of
the Phillips curve is far from settled.
As the natural rate of unemployment results from the balance
between job creation and destruction processes, reductions in unem-
ployment rates require complementingmacro stimulation bymicroeco-
nomic structural and institutional reforms. These include containing
mark-up power of ﬁrms and unions over and above the cost of produc-
tion and marginal productivity of labour, anchoring expected inﬂation
to the steady growth of the economy, adopting less stringent laws on
the minimum wage rate or for insider–outsider or efﬁciency wage
bargaining and relaxing the rules on hiring and ﬁring. Reducing frictions
or rigidities in this manner shifts Phillips or Beveridge curves towards
left, making economic growth possible with low inﬂation and low un-
employment rates with more dynamic and ﬂexible labour markets.
Section 2 focuses on review of theories regarding causes of unem-
ployment for basic derivations of the expectation augmented Phillips
curve showing trade-off between inﬂation and unemployment. Empir-
ical tests on causality and cointegration and trade-offs between inﬂa-
tion–unemployment, aggregate supply and Okun curves with the
quarterly time series for 40 economies are in Section 3. These are
followed by conclusions of the study in Section 4. Macroeconomic
links between Phillips curve, Okun and money growth equations for
analyses of impacts of contractionary or expansionary monetary and
ﬁscal policies and implications on minimisation of loss functions with
discretionary or optimal choices of inﬂation are brieﬂy presented in
appendices A and B.
2. Theories of unemployment and inﬂation
Theoretically speaking unemployment cannot exist in the classical
general equilibrium system unless labour markets are distorted by
rules such as the national minimumwage rate. Theworld is not entirely
classical, however. Recessions have been frequent and common as seen
from the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008 which caused recessions up to 6% of
GDP in several OECD countries. Keynes's suggestion for treating the la-
bour supply as inﬁnitely elastic and adding demand to create employ-
ment may have worked well until the late 1960s, when the majority
of the advanced economies had spare productive capacity but they
stopped working since that time. All countries in the OECD went
through inﬂationary spirals when they were close to their potentials
for production and faced continued rise in the oil prices starting early
1970s. Developments of the rational expectation hypothesis by Lucas
(1973) led to contractionary measures taken in 1980s and 1990s to re-
duce inﬂation which raised unemployment rates signiﬁcantly in all ad-
vanced economies.Whilst these unemployment rates had not fallen yet
to desirable levels in many of the EU economies, mainly due to down-
ward rigidity of nominal wages and prices, ﬁnancial crises of 2008 has
aggravated this problem further.
An early analysis on whether there exists any trade-off between un-
employment and inﬂation was in Phillips (1958). Many subsequent
studies including those by McDonald and Solow (1981); Dixon
(1988); Lockwood and Manning (1989); Lockwood et al. (1998);
Nickell (1990, 1998); Caballero and Hammour (1994) and Pissarides
(2000) highlighted on controversies on this relationship emphasising
that such trade-offs represent missing supply side links in Keynesian
models. Keynesian expansionary measures were widely adopted in
2009 to combat recessions in contrast to policy irrelevance propositions
under the rational expectation. Several countries were able to create
extra jobs and contain the recession stimulating demands for products
through expansionary monetary or ﬁscal policies. Such stimuli have
been very fruitful during this phase of recession. Most economistsbelieve that such policy works until an economy crosses a threshold to
the natural rate. Wage–price spiral is likely to reoccur bringing uncer-
tainties on investment and employment if these expansionary policies
are pursued further. This is a reason behind the adoption ofﬁscal auster-
ity inmanyOECD countries including their debt reduction programmes.
Demand stimulating policy should not be pursued further as it may
push the debt GDP ratio at a level that ismore than acceptable. Lowering
the natural rate of unemployment in such circumstances requires
reforms on the supply side, particularly in the structure of the labour
market, systems of welfare, transfer and beneﬁt and unemployment in-
surance.More ﬂexibility in the labourmarket ensures smooth process of
search and matching and removes many institutional supply side dis-
tortions as analysed in Pissarides (2013) for a sustainable growth in
these economies. Policy of stimulating aggregate demand to reduce
the employment rate below this natural rate thus has to deal with
these structural rigidities to be more effective. This is also the reason
why central banks were increasingly mandated to pursue inﬂation
targeting regimes in the last two decades (Svensson, 1997) in these
countries. With price stability, growth and employment can come
from supply side policies and institutional reforms that remove nominal
and real rigidities in the labour markets.
In price-sticky Keynesian models optimal response to an increase in
cyclical unemployment, as occurred in 1970s and 1980s and even now
inmanyOECD economies,would be an increase in the level of aggregate
demand often ﬁnanced by more borrowing assuming a perfectly elastic
supply curve for output. Following Phillips (1958) it is argued that addi-
tional demand not only raises the level of output and employment but
also raises the level of prices as employers have to pay higher wage
rates to induce more hours from existing or new workers. The natural
rate and rational expectation hypotheses go even further, after the argu-
ments developed by Phelps (1968) or Friedman (1968); Lucas (1973);
Fisher (1977) and others, about the wage–price dynamics in industrial
economies. When unions and workers can correctly expect real wage
rates and future events in the labour market they adjust their labour
supply accordingly leaving the natural rate of unemployment un-
changed. This renders monetary policy ineffective at achieving real ob-
jectives in the long run (Monetary Policy Committee, 1999). Under the
rational expectation hypothesis, the majority of economists tend to be-
lieve that only unanticipated policy shocks could have real impacts in
the economy (Lucas and Rapping, 1969; Lucas, 1976; Sargent and
Wallace, 1975). Consequently inﬂation targeting became the major ob-
jective of the central banks in themost advanced economies resulting in
more stability in price levels (Svensson, 1997). Persistence of high and
varying rates of unemployment among these countries is attributed to
real and nominal rigidities in their labour markets.
Let us derive a Phillips curve following the new Keynesian analysis
that introduces rigidities and imperfections in goods and labour mar-
kets that makes an aggregate supply curve to slope upwards than
being a horizontal (inﬁnitely elastic one) as assumed in a Keynesian
model. Imperfections ultimately results in mark-up behaviour of ﬁrms
and workers (Blanchard and Kiyotaki, 1987; Manning, 1995; Rankin,
1992; Burda and Wyplosz, 2002). Most of these market imperfection
models treat labour as the only variable input as plants andmachineries
cannot be varied in the short run. The simplest form of the market im-
perfection model contains monopolistic mark up of product prices by
ﬁrms and on wage rates by the unions. When setting the prices (P) of
commodities ﬁrmsmark up (μ) over the cost of labour (W) paid to pro-
duce those commodities. That means:
Pt ¼ 1þ μð ÞWt : ð1Þ
Unions concerned for the real wage rate of their members mark up
(γ) over the expected price level (Pte) as:
Wt ¼ 1þ γð ÞPet : ð2Þ
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price and wage rates due to imperfections in the labour and product
markets is:
Pt ¼ 1þ μð Þ 1þ γð ÞPet : ð3Þ
Firms can charge higher mark ups if the actual aggregate demand is
higher than the trend and lower if the actual unemployment is higher
than the natural rate of unemployment. Unions (or workers) care for
real wages. They also charge mark-ups over the expected price level
while negotiating the wage rates from employers. They are stronger
when the economy is close to the full employment level than when it
is in a recession. Dividing both sides of the price equation by Pt−1 yields:
Pt
Pt−1
¼ 1þ μð Þ 1þ γð Þ P
e
t
Pt−1
: ð4Þ
Deﬁne inﬂation as πt ¼ Pt−Pt−1Pt−1 and modify this equation as:
1þ πtð Þ ¼ 1þ μð Þ 1þ γð Þ 1þ πet
 
: ð5Þ
Using the law of small numbers, this can be approximated by πt=
μ+γ+πte, where the term (μ+γ) is the sum of the mark ups charged
by the unions and ﬁrms. Both type of mark-ups, μ and γ, are normally
higher in boom periods and lower during the recession. Let all sorts of
non-labour costs in the economy such as an increase in oil prices,
increase in the prices of raw materials, increase in the interest rate or
the cost of capital be taken by the aggregate supply shock s. The short
run dynamics of trade-off between inﬂation and unemployment are
given by the expectation augmented Phillips' curve as:
πt ¼ π þ
a y−yð Þ
or
u−unð Þ
8<
:
9=
;þ s ð6Þ
where y is the actual output and y is the trend output, thus the term
ðy−yÞ reﬂects the deviation of output from the trend, (u−un) reﬂects
how the actual unemployment rate differs from the natural rate of un-
employment and s denotes to a normally distributed shock to the sup-
ply function or to the Phillips curve. The parameter a is positive and b
is negative. The short and long run Phillips curves implied by these
equations are as given in Fig. 1.
Thus the trade-offs between inﬂation and unemployment means
that policy makers may reduce unemployment rate below its naturalFig. 1. Phillips Curve, NAIRU or natural rate of unemployment.rate in the short run at the cost of higher inﬂation but the economy
moves back to the natural rate of unemployment once workers are
able to make more realistic expectation of the rise in the price level in
their wage contract. For instance suppose the economy is at an equilib-
rium point a in Fig. 1 in the beginning and government wants to reduce
unemployment rate below the natural rate by using expansionary poli-
cy. This creates extra demand for labour and reduces the unemploy-
ment rate. Overtime workers learn that prices have increased. Their
expectation of inﬂation rises. Phillips curve shifts out to the right and
becomes vertical in the long run without any real impacts on the levels
of output and employment.
Instead of expected inﬂation (πte) being equal to a constant π, the
actual inﬂation can be modelled as a backward-looking way πte=πt−1
or a forward looking way πte=πt+1or combination of these two as:
πt ¼ δπetþ1 þ 1−δð Þπt−1; 0 b δ b 1: ð7Þ
These mark ups, (μ+γ) are proportional to the marginal costs
(ϕmc) in the Hybrid New Keynesian Phillips curve1 as:
πt ¼ δπetþ1 þ 1−δð Þπt−1 þ ϕmc; ϕ N 0: ð8Þ
When the actual inﬂation equals to what is expected, πt−πte=0
then the actual unemployment rates equals to the natural rate of unem-
ployment (NAIRU) as ut−un=0. Then the output gap is zero yt−y ¼ 0.
This means:
yt N y⇒ πt N π
e
t and ut b un
 
or yt b y⇒ πt π
e
t and ut
 
un
 
: ð9Þ
Putting them together in a diagram in (y, π) space gives themacroeco-
nomic equilibrium (or disequilibrium) characterised by the underlying
short and long run aggregate demand (PC1–PC3) and supply functions
(SAS and LAS) along with a Keynesian supply function (KAS) as shown
in Fig. 2. Unemployment rate is higher than the natural rate, utNun,
when output is below its natural rate ytby and lower than its natural
rate, utbunwhen output is above the natural rate,yt Ny. Demand and sup-
ply side consequences on inﬂation are obvious from the vertical axis.
There are three cases, when actual inﬂation can be above, belowor exact-
ly as the expected inﬂation depending onwhether output is under, above
or exactly at the equilibrium position as shown along the horizontal axis.
Nowdeﬁning the deviation of output off the steady state as yt−yy ¼ Yt
andΔπt ¼ γYt þ st with a supply shock, st as above, a version of Phillips
curvewith backward looking inﬂation expectation becomesπt ¼ πet þ γ
Yt þ st or πt ¼ πt−1 þ γYt þ st . Given the marginal productivity of
capital ðrÞ, the monetary policy rule is used to alter the real interest
rate (Rt) to control inﬂation towards its target ðπÞ as:
Rt−rð Þ ¼ m πt−πð Þ:
Actually the central banks set the nominal interest rate (i), which ac-
cording to Fisher equation, is the sum of real interest rate and inﬂation:
i ¼ Rt þ πt ¼ r þ πt þm πt−πð Þ: ð10Þ
Putting this rule in the IS curve gives the aggregate demand equation
as:
Yt ¼ a−b Rt−rð Þ ¼ a−bm πt−πð Þ: ð11Þ1 Blanchard (2016) modiﬁes the basic Phillip's curve including expected inﬂation and
inﬂation on imports as πt ¼ π−bðu−uÞ þ δπet þ ð1−δÞπt−1 þ μπmt þ st where the expec-
tation is πte=πt+1+βπt+1⁎+ηt. He also argues that under the low inﬂation regimes after
the greatmoderation the expected inﬂation is a constant number such asπ in our equation
above. Empirically he also found slope of the Phillip's curve to be signiﬁcant but small for
the US economy and argued the more variability in the Phillip's curve relations is due to
large standard errors of the noise term st.
Fig. 2. Aggregate supply, inﬂation and natural rate of unemployment hypothesis.
96 K. Bhattarai / Economic Modelling 58 (2016) 93–103This means when the actual inﬂation is above the target inﬂation,
the nominal interest rate should rise. This should cause a fall in the ag-
gregate demand relative to its steady state. Howmuchwill output con-
tract depends on the slopes of the IS curve (b) andmonetary policy rule
(m) and the difference between the current real interest rate (Rt) and
the long run average marginal product of capital ðrÞ or the inﬂation
gap.2 If the actual output equals the steady state output, there is no
deviation. This means Y ¼ 0 and a ¼ 0⇒−bðR−rÞ ¼ 0⇒R ¼ r. This is
the equilibrium condition where real interest rate equals the marginal
product of capital. Actual inﬂation also equals to its target and the actual
unemployment equals the natural rate of unemployment. Business
cycle ﬂuctuations occur when Y≠0. In summary:
• Keynes suggested raising aggregate demand to bring economy to the
full employment level. Sticky prices makes supply curve horizontal
(KAS in Fig. 2) and equilibrium output increaseswith every expansion
in aggregate demand as economy never reaches the level of full em-
ployment. He ignored economy when it is close to its full capacity.
• New Keynesian economists argue that additional demand not only
raises the level of output and employment but also the level of prices
as employers need to pay higher wage rates to induce more supply of
labour by workers. Thus there is a trade-off between inﬂation and
unemployment; lower rate of unemployment can be obtained only
by accepting higher inﬂation. Phillips (1958) found this trade-offs by
studying 96 years of data on wage and unemployment in the UK.
• When labour market is very tight, raising aggregate demand (say by
deﬁcit ﬁnancing) only raises the price level. Higher inﬂation is very
harmful- it creates uncertainty and affects economic activities
negatively.32 The IS curve is derived above following Jones (2011) in which a=ac+ai+
ag+ax−am; here ac, ai, ag, ax and am denote the shares of consumption, investment, gov-
ernment spending, exports and imports to the GDP; (ac ¼ CtY , ai ¼
I0;t
Y
, ag ¼ GtY , ax ¼
Xt
Y
, am ¼
Mt
Y
). Thus the aggregate demand at period t relative to the steady state is given by:
Yt
Y
¼ ac þ ai−b R−rð Þ þ ag þ ax−am ¼ a−b R−rð Þ:
In the form of deviation from the steady state, Yt ¼ YtY −1 ¼ a−bðRt−rÞ; a ¼ a−1:3 See Keynes (1936); Hicks (1937); Lewis (1954). Phillips (1958) studied for 1861–
1957 in UK. He was followed by Phelps (1968); Friedman's (1968); Lucas and Rapping
(1969); Lucas (1976); Brunner et al. (1976); Layard and Nickell (1986, 1990) and
Blanchﬂower and Oswald (1994); Cross (1988); Hoon (2001); Manning (1995); Mankiw
(1985); Dixon (1988); Ball and Romer (1990), McDonald and Solow (1981); Dixon
(1988); Lockwood and Manning (1989); Lockwood et al. (1998); Nickel (1990); Nickell
(1998). For search and matching models see Pissarides (2000) and Mortensen and
Pissarides (1994); Caballero and Hammour (1994) and Pissarides (2000); Bianchi and
Zoega (1998); Hutchinson and Walsh (1998); Nickell (1998); Phelps and Zoega (1998);
Madsen (1998); King (2004); Yellen (1984); Nickell and Quintini (2003); Lindebeck
and Snower (1988).• Flexibility is important for the labourmarket efﬁciency and for higher
level of output, employment and lower level of prices. Taxes, beneﬁts,
working tax credit system, union activities, international competition,
technological factors and employment tax are factors that determine
such ﬂexibility. These supply side factors should be corrected to re-
duce unemployment rather than stimulating aggregate demand by
an expansionary ﬁscal policy.
Unemployment–inﬂation trade-offs discussed in this section would
be incomplete without understandingwhy unemployment rates can-
not be reduced below the natural rate by a ﬁscal stimulus or why
some countries tend to have higher unemployment rates in contrast
to other countries? This is essentially an empirical issue and requires
econometric analysis of such trade-off in each country or in the
panel of OECD countries. The theories of unemployment and inﬂation
trade-offs as stated in this section will be tested empirically using
quarterly series on unemployment rate, inﬂation and growth rates
for 1990:1 to 2014:1 in the next section.
3. Empirical analysis
3.1. Data: correlations, cointegrations and causality tests
We take the quarterly data series on inﬂation, unemployment rate
and growth rate for OECD economies from 1991:1 to 2014:4 from the
database available on the OECD web page4 to investigate trade-offs
between inﬂation and unemployment. Nature of correlations between
inﬂation and unemployment (Phillips curve), between growth and un-
employment rate (Okun's curve) and the inﬂation and growth rate of
output (aggregate supply curve) for this period are as given in Table 1.
Out of 3240 possible pairs of correlations there are evidences for both
the positive (ρ+) and the negative (ρ−) correlations. Contrary to expec-
tation, about 54% correlations were positive for inﬂation–unemployment
and 68% between growth rate and unemployment rate. Similarly about
66% correlations were positive between growth and inﬂation. This may
indicate to lack of unambiguous relationship between these variables
but correlations do not imply any causality.
Further empirical analysis of the relation between inﬂation, unem-
ployment and growth rates requires checking on stationarity of these
series. Growth rate series were stationary for almost all countries, inﬂa-
tion were stationary for most countries but the unemployment rates
were stationary only in theﬁrst differences formost countries. However
cointegrating relations between inﬂation and unemployment were sig-
niﬁcant for all of these countries as shown by tau - test and z-stat for
cointegration tests in Table 2. There were also bidirectional Granger
causality between the inﬂation and unemployment series as shown by
signiﬁcant F test statistics in Table 3. Full results of stationarity and
cointegration tests are not reported here for space reasons. From these
tests it seems statistically acceptable to conduct simple OLS regression
analyses between inﬂation and unemployment rate series among
these countries.
3.2. Inﬂation–unemployment trade-offs: country speciﬁc Phillips curves
Country speciﬁc regressions in Table 4 are estimates of a simple OLS
of inﬂation on unemployment, πt=β0−β1ut+ei , t as our objective is
just to ﬁnd trade-offs between these two variables. We use Doornik
and Hendry (2003) routines in PcGive to estimate slope coefﬁcients
reported in Table 4. As results show Phillips curve relations seem to be
signiﬁcant for 28 of 37 countries (including averages for the Euro area
and EU; Turkey was not included as it was an outlier) in this table.
Phillips curve was not signiﬁcant in countries such as Austria, Brazil,4 https://data.oecd.org/price/inﬂation-cpi.htm.
Table 1
Correlations for the Phillips curve, aggregate supply and Okuns curves in the OECD data
(1990:1–2014:4).
Number of positive and negative correlations
N ρ+ ρ−
Phillips curve 3240 (1.000) 1705 (0.54) 1535 (0.46)
Okun's curve 3240 (1.000) 2232 (0.68) 1008 (0.32)
Aggregate supply 3240 (1.000) 2129 (0.66) 1111 (0.44)
Table 3
Granger causality test between unemployment and inﬂation in the OECD (1990:1–
2014:4).
F-stat Prob*
Unemployment does not cause inﬂation 14.49 0.00
Inﬂation does not cause unemployment 9.22 0.00
N = 2243; H0: no causality; lags 2.
⁎ Signiﬁcance at 1%.
Table 4
Phillips curve: regression of inﬂation on unemployment in OECD countries, 1990–2014
(quarterly series).
Coefﬁcients t-prob R2 F-prob Constant t-prob
Australia −0.385 0.015 0.086 0.015 4.940 0.000
Austria −0.166 0.239 0.020 0.024 2.690 0.000
Belgium −0.879 0.000 0.254 0.000 8.840 0.000
Brazil 0.160 0.155 0.030 0.155 4.760 0.000
Canada −0.533 0.000 0.171 0.000 5.787 0.000
Chile −0.347 0.038 0.063 0.000 6.205 0.000
Czech Republic −0.319 0.073 0.051 0.073 4.710 0.000
Denmark −0.151 0.035 0.065 0.035 2.850 0.000
Estonia −0.292 0.003 0.139 0.003 6.797 0.000
Euro area (19) −0.296 0.003 0.213 0.003 4.745 0.000
European Union (28) −0.338 0.003 0.205 0.003 5.218 0.000
Finland −0.391 0.001 0.153 0.001 5.090 0.000
France −0.587 0.000 0.307 0.000 6.845 0.000
Germany −0.031 0.501 0.006 0.501 1.721 0.000
Greece −0.207 0.000 0.557 0.000 5.532 0.000
Hungary −0.555 0.002 0.147 0.002 9.898 0.000
Iceland 0.255 0.356 0.019 0.356 4.350 0.000
Ireland −0.400 0.000 0.419 0.000 5.513 0.000
Israel −0.098 0.566 0.005 0.566 3.180 0.025
Italy −0.136 0.006 0.104 0.007 3.317 0.000
Japan −1.475 0.000 0.575 0.000 6.666 0.000
Korea 0.351 0.035 0.065 0.035 1.630 0.017
Luxembourg −0.374 0.017 0.062 0.168 3.990 0.006
Mexico −2.236 0.000 0.306 0.000 14.920 0.000
Netherlands −0.282 0.000 0.175 0.000 3.218 0.000
New Zealand −0.461 0.000 0.230 0.000 4.770 0.000
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dicate to underlying natural rates of unemployment and all of them are
signiﬁcant. Strong labour unions in these countries cause rigidities in la-
bour markets and this reduces the trade-offs between inﬂation and un-
employment. Efﬁciency wages make cost of job search and matching
quite high causing high rate of equilibrium unemployment in these
economies. Koustas and Serletis (2003) had found similar relations for
a subset of these countries. Why do we observe this pattern? Explana-
tions may go like this. Demand for labour is derived from the demand
for output. When an economy is growing fast, demand for labour will
be plenty relative to its supply with lower rates of unemployment. In
contrast there are recessionary periods when many workers are ready
towork but do notﬁnd jobs. There are structural reasons for excess sup-
ply of labour like this. The main one of these being the rigidity in the
nominal wage rates despite falling prices. When workers have higher
reservation wage rates, the cost conscious employers cannot hire
them at that expensive rate. Then many workers are likely to remain
unemployed.
When ﬁrms put higher mark-up (over the wage rate) on the prices
of goods and services they sell, workers are bound to raise their mark-
up onwage rates that they apply on the prices of commodities to main-
tain their real wage rates. Such behaviour creates imperfections in the
labourmarket that often sets a process ofwage–price spiral and disequi-
librium in the labour market. That manifests itself in higher unemploy-
ment rates. On the other side the Keynesian remedy of creating
additional demand by expansionary ﬁscal or monetary policy can
push the aggregate demand beyond the productive capacity of the
economy. This causes not only inﬂation but also an upward movement
in the Phillips curve eroding the trade-offs even further and shifting this
curve towards right.
Manymacro economists still believe that an economymay be below
or above the natural rate of unemployment in the short run but it will
move towards the natural rate of unemployment in the long run. As
Friedman (1968) argued the natural rate of output and employment is
“ground out” by the equilibrium in goods, labour and money markets.
Frictional unemployment, non-accelerating inﬂation rate of unemploy-
ment (NAIRU), or structural unemployment are widely discussed in the
literature as an essential process and outcome of the dynamic adjust-
ment mechanism in an economy. For these reasons analyses of Phillips
curve effects should be complimented by analyses of the tax-beneﬁt
system, technological progress and efﬁciency of the job market in
matching employees and employers as the explanatory powers of this
model parameters in Table 4 are quite weak as shown by very low
value of R-square values despite signiﬁcant F-statistics. As in the classi-
cal model, unemployment rates are caused by institutional factors such
as the minimum wage laws or rules regarding work hours, retirement,Table 2
Cointegration test between unemployment and inﬂation in the OECD (1990:1–2014:4).
Tau-test Proba Zstat Proba
Unemployment −8.64 0.00 −197.43 0.00
Inﬂation −4.21 0.00 −50.58 0.00
a MacKinnon (1996) p-values; H0: no cointegration.tax, beneﬁts and transfers, terms of employment, payment for sickness
and family tax credits. There are signiﬁcant variations across OECD
countries in the tax and beneﬁt system and in the ﬂexibility of the la-
bour market (Nickell, 1998). Workers and ﬁrms face different con-
straints in their choices of discrete or continuous work hours and the
marginal beneﬁts. Generous system of beneﬁts raises the reservation
wage of those workers and keeps them away from the labour market
and can create beneﬁt traps leading to signiﬁcantly higher unemploy-
ment rates despite a heavy stimulus as in Spain and Italy as stated
above.
These frictional features of the labour market are often explained in
terms of a model that consists job ﬁnding rate (f) of currently unem-
ployed (U) and job separation rates (s) of currently employed (E).
Both of these rates are inﬂuenced by the structure of the labourmarket.
As discussed in Mankiw (1985) a change in the level of unemployment,
ΔU, is the difference between job separation and job ﬁnding ratesΔU ¼
sE−fU. In a ﬂexible labour market with labour force L,equilibrium un-
employment rate (UL) results from a balance between people who quit
or are laid off a job (sE) and workers who get a new employment (fU),Norway −0.389 0.157 0.034 0.157 3.299 0.000
Poland −0.501 0.005 0.940 0.005 64.700 0.003
Portugal −0.183 0.000 0.244 0.000 3.830 0.000
Russia 8.369 0.000 0.625 0.000 −47.158 0.000
Slovak Republic 0.632 0.000 0.253 0.000 −4.588 0.027
Slovenia −0.687 0.001 0.158 0.001 8.731 0.000
Spain −0.133 0.000 0.351 0.000 4.576 0.000
Sweden −0.611 0.000 0.346 0.000 5.602 0.000
United Kingdom 0.535 0.000 0.386 0.000 −1.094 0.005
United States −0.284 0.000 0.194 0.000 4.059 0.000
Table 5
Supply curve: regression of inﬂation on growth rates in OECD countries, 1990–2014
(quarterly series).
Coefﬁcients t-prob R2 F-prob Constant t-prob
Australia −0.010 0.886 0.000 0.887 2.767 0.000
Austria −0.252 0.241 0.021 0.241 2.108 0.000
Belgium −0.041 0.748 0.001 0.784 1.977 0.000
Brazil −0.768 0.173 0.028 0.173 6.571 0.000
Canada −0.092 0.313 0.015 0.313 2.004 0.000
Chile −0.901 0.029 0.070 0.029 3.877 0.000
Czech Republic −0.369 0.152 0.031 0.152 3.238 0.000
Denmark −0.091 0.393 0.011 0.393 2.037 0.000
Estonia −0.020 0.218 0.023 0.218 4.297 0.000
Euro area (19) −0.090 0.580 0.005 0.580 1.936 0.000
European Union (28) 0.114 0.585 0.005 0.585 2.470 0.000
Finland −0.126 0.268 0.019 0.269 1.792 0.000
France −0.145 0.420 0.010 0.420 1.550 0.000
Germany −0.022 0.819 0.000 0.820 1.478 0.000
Greece 0.037 0.793 0.001 0.793 2.721 0.000
Hungary 0.567 0.217 0.023 0.217 5.666 0.000
Iceland −0.276 0.056 0.054 0.057 5.396 0.000
Ireland 0.207 0.303 0.016 0.300 2.676 0.000
Israel −0.304 0.300 0.016 0.300 2.676 0.000
Italy −0.182 0.193 0.025 0.197 2.077 0.000
Japan −0.311 0.006 0.108 0.006 0.039 0.784
Korea −0.568 0.000 0.268 0.000 3.597 0.000
Luxembourg −0.095 0.164 0.029 0.164 2.206 0.000
Mexico −0.152 0.775 0.001 0.775 6.221 0.000
Netherlands −0.327 0.028 0.070 0.029 2.183 0.000
New Zealand −0.543 0.009 0.099 0.009 2.576 0.000
Norway −0.185 0.114 0.037 0.114 2.084 0.000
Poland −0.481 0.387 0.011 0.387 4.289 0.000
Portugal −0.107 0.608 0.004 0.608 2.299 0.000
Russia 3.589 0.021 0.076 0.021 13.704 0.000
Slovak Republic −0.010 0.617 0.003 0.672 4.912 0.000
Slovenia 0.470 0.093 0.042 0.093 3.931 0.000
Spain 0.584 0.013 0.090 0.013 2.221 0.000
Sweden −0.260 0.095 0.042 0.093 1.312 0.000
United Kingdom −0.771 0.000 0.239 0.000 2.501 0.000
United States 0.058 0.791 0.001 0.791 2.287 0.000
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countries with higher separation rates, s, and lower for higher job ﬁnd-
ing rates, f. Government and institutions across OECD economies vary in
the effectiveness of intervention for inﬂuencing s and f by taking mea-
sures such as improving the ﬂow of information between potential em-
ployees and employers, providing training for long term unemployed to
make thememployable. The jobmatching process by creatingdatabases
of CVs of potential applicants and vacancies of employers differ.
Time series models explain the unemployment rate series in terms
of trends, cycles, seasonal and random factors and emphasise in the per-
sistency of the unemployment rate because of rigidities in the labour
market using sophisticated stochastic processes. Some authors focus
on mismatch between creation of new jobs and destruction of old jobs
due to new innovations in the production process (Blanchard and
Katz, 1997; Caballero and Hammour, 1994; Pissarides, 2000). Others
have applied the stochastic Markov switching processes to explain the
change in the natural rate of unemployment over time (Sarantis,
1993; Bianchi and Zoega, 1998).
3.3. Panel data model for inﬂation and unemployment trade-offs
While the evidence is mixed for the individual economies, there
certainly appears trade-offs between unemployment and inﬂation in
the panel of these OECD countries as shown by the coefﬁcients for the
random and ﬁxed effect models in Table 7; a signiﬁcant Hausman test
statistic is in favour of randomeffectmodel. GMMestimation for the dy-
namic panel accounts of unobserved heterogeneity among countries,
and estimates of it are as given in Table 8. Both of these panel estimates
were frompanelmodel routines in STATA for a panel regression of inﬂa-
tion on unemployment of the form πi ,t=βi ,0+β1ui ,t−1+γt+ei ,t with
βi ,0 as individual speciﬁc effects and γt as the time speciﬁc effects.
Slopes of Phillips curve are signiﬁcant in all panel data models and
have expected negative signs but the GMM coefﬁcients are smaller
than those in random or ﬁxed effects models as these are corrected for
unobserved heterogeneity. There thus are trade-offs between inﬂation
and unemployment when one regresses inﬂation on unemployment
rates.
The rational expectation school shows limitations of the demand
management policies in controlling inﬂation by introducing expecta-
tions of prices in wage negotiations by unions and workers. For them
stability and growth need to rely more on supply side policies including
reforms in the labourmarket. Using sophisticated economicmodels, the
real business cycle school, like classical school, rules out the existence of
such involuntary unemployment rate. For them ﬂuctuations in employ-
ment rates are considered to be features of inter-temporal optimisation
process of individuals and technical shocks (Kydland and Prescott,
1977; Chadha and Noland, 2004). They even suggested to scrap the no-
tion of the Phillips curve entirely from macroeconomic models. Let us
now regress inﬂation on growth rates for an idea of underlying aggre-
gate supply functions implied in the data (Table 5) and regress unem-
ployment on growth rates for estimation of Okun coefﬁcients in
Tables 6. (See Tables 10 and 11.)
3.4. Inﬂation on growth rates: country speciﬁc supply functions
Thinness of trade-off between unemployment and inﬂation results
discussed above prompt us to estimate aggregate supply functions for
these economies in the form of πt=β0+β1gt+et where inﬂation (πt)
is regressed on the growth rate (gt). This is a short run aggregate supply
function. The slope coefﬁcientswere signiﬁcant only in three of 37 coun-
tries as shown in Table 5. Only Spain, Slovenia and Russia had positive
and signiﬁcant slope of aggregate supply curves. Constants of these re-
gressions represent average growth rates, which are signiﬁcant and rea-
sonable for these countries. Japan, Korea, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Spain, UK and Sweden, Hungary and Chile seem to have signiﬁcantbut negative relation between inﬂation and growth rates. This either in-
dicates to contractionarymeasures taken to reduce the inﬂation, partic-
ularly under the explicit or implicit inﬂation targeting regimes having
adverse impacts on economic growth or real factors such as physical
and human capital and technological progress as factors causing growth
rather than stimulations of aggregate demand. Xu et al. (2015) found
similar relation for the US using a quintile regression technique. This
also indicates toweakness of demand oriented policies to create growth
and employment. The aggregate supply function does not work well
with rigidity in prices and wages in the short run. Expansionary mone-
tary or ﬁscal policies may be able to raise aggregate demand but may
not be signiﬁcant in reducing unemployment rates. Such effect occurs
because prices and wages adjust at slower rates than the output or em-
ployment after an expansionary programme (Phelps and Taylor, 1977;
Ball et al., 1988; Ball and Romer, 1990; Nickell, 1998; Barro, 1995;
DeAnne, 1998). Then as argued in the classical and new classical theo-
ries of employment perfect ﬂexibility of wages and prices means an ex-
pansionary policy is more likely to raise the price level than reducing
unemployment. Equilibrium unemployment rates are less affected by
a stimulus to demand because of neutrality of money, it requires supply
side reforms (Yellen, 1984; Manning, 1995, Layard and Nickell, 1990;
Nickell and Quintini, 2003; Roed and Zhang, 2003).
Wage rate and employment levels are settled by bargaining between
ﬁrms and workers (McDonald and Solow, 1981; Barro and Gordon,
1983; Bean, 1994; Lockwood et al., 1998; Lockwood and Manning,
1989) or insider–outsider behaviour of unions and their interaction
with ﬁrms (Taylor, 1972; Lindebeck and Snower, 1988; Blanchard and
Kiyotaki, 1987). OECD economies vary in mark up on prices by ﬁrms
and mark up on wage rates by unions. Both of these behaviours cause
Table 6
Okun's curve: regression of unemployment rate on growth rates in OECD countries, 1990–
2014 (quarterly series).
Coefﬁcients t-prob R2 F-prob Constant t-prob
Australia −0.177 0.000 0.157 0.001 5.794 0.000
Austria −0.232 0.213 0.023 0.213 4.870 0.000
Belgium 0.137 0.173 0.030 0.173 7.770 0.000
Brazil 4.677 0.005 0.112 0.005 8.782 0.000
Canada −0.032 0.652 0.003 0.652 7.243 0.000
Chile 0.141 0.641 0.003 0.641 8.202 0.000
Czech Republic 0.234 0.080 0.049 0.080 6.940 0.000
Denmark 0.601 0.739 0.012 0.739 5.508 0.000
Estonia 0.195 0.336 0.016 0.336 9.899 0.000
Euro area (19) −0.175 0.607 0.007 0.607 9.705 0.000
European Union (28) 0.064 0.872 0.000 0.872 9.058 0.000
Finland 0.300 0.006 0.106 0.007 8.422 0.000
France 0.193 0.355 0.019 0.355 8.911 0.000
Germany 0.142 0.579 0.005 0.579 8.045 0.000
Greece −1.261 0.102 0.096 0.010 13.677 0.000
Hungary −0.849 0.000 0.169 0.001 8.436 0.000
Iceland −0.161 0.115 0.053 0.114 4.708 0.000
Ireland −0.459 0.064 0.051 0.064 8.307 0.000
Israel −0.062 0.769 0.001 0.769 8.077 0.000
Italy 0.133 0.694 0.002 0.694 9.188 0.000
Japan 0.108 0.068 0.049 0.069 4.505 0.000
Korea 0.165 0.091 0.042 0.091 3.750 0.000
Luxembourg −0.113 0.216 0.051 0.216 5.099 0.000
Mexico 0.011 0.084 0.000 0.933 3.921 0.000
Netherlands −0.080 0.723 0.002 0.723 4.143 0.000
New Zealand 0.044 0.842 0.000 0.842 5.502 0.000
Norway 0.066 0.296 0.012 0.296 3.407 0.000
Poland 0.017 0.948 0.002 0.947 10.799 0.000
Portugal −1.855 0.000 0.164 0.001 8.855 0.000
Russia 0.545 0.002 0.143 0.002 6.969 0.000
Slovak Republic 0.067 0.722 0.002 0.722 14.828 0.000
Slovenia −0.082 0.093 0.042 0.093 3.931 0.000
Spain −5.087 0.000 0.332 0.000 17.612 0.000
Sweden 0.132 0.422 0.012 0.422 6.924 0.000
United Kingdom −0.465 0.043 0.065 0.043 6.310 0.000
United States −0.522 0.118 0.037 0.119 6.422 0.000
Table 8
Dynamic GMM panel regression of the Phillips curve: Arellano–Bover/Blundell–Bond
estimation.
Dep variable: inﬂation Coefﬁcient Z-value p N |z |
Inﬂation (−1) 0.8925*** 132.73 0.00
Unemployment rate −0.0431 −3.08 0.002
Constant 0.5934*** 4.95 0.00
Wald χ2(2) = 21,156.27 (0.000).
Sample size N= 38; NT = 2221.
⁎⁎⁎ Signiﬁcance at 1%.
Table 9
VAR model of inﬂation and unemployment for OECD countries, 1990–2014 (quarterly
series).
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leading to higher values of natural rates of unemployment. These factors
should explain why supply functions are insigniﬁcant in our estimates.
In Yellen's (1984) model output is a function of employment and
efforts, Y=F[e(w)N], whereN is the number of employees and e is effort
per worker and w is the real wage rate. Marginal product of labour is
equals to real efﬁciencywage rate,w⁎=e(w)F′[e(w)N]. Firms do not re-
duce real wages below this believing that it would reduce productivity
of all workers. Such efﬁciency wage makes the supply function irrele-
vant in linking prices to output.
3.5. Unemployment on growth rates: estimation of Okun's curves
How much less growth occurs because of more unemployment?
This is an issue of the Okun's curve. We estimate and test this proposi-
tion using a simple function, ut=β0−β1gt+et. In Okun's originalTable 7
Static panel regression estimates of Phillips curves for OECD countries (1990:1–2014:4).
Dep variable: inﬂation Fixed effect Random effect
Unemployment rate - 0.163*** - 0.140***
Constant 4.088*** 3.888***
Tests F(1,2270)=99.49(0.000) Wald: χ2(2) = 71.7 (0.000)
Sample N= 38; NT = 2309 N= 38; NT = 2309
Within 0.0408 0.0408
Between 0.1344 0.1344
Overall 0.0059 0.0059
Hausman test for random effect model χ2(2) = 24.46 (0.000).
⁎⁎⁎ Signiﬁcance at 1%.estimate for the US economy a 3% reduction in unemployment reduced
growth rate by 1%. Here we use our data to estimate this relationship
and ﬁnd that the coefﬁcients of Okun curve for growth on unemploy-
ment had expected negative sign and signiﬁcant only in 13 of these
countries. These results are given in Table 6. Australia, Greece, Ireland,
Portugal, Slovenia, Spain and UK had negative and signiﬁcant relations
between unemployment and growth rates but Brazil and Poland had
signiﬁcant and positive relationships. Mixed results of the Okun's
curve also indicates institutional and structural causes of unemploy-
ment - leading support to job-less growth hypothesis. Let us consider
reason why the relation is week between unemployment and growth
rates. First the union ﬁrm behaviours and the wage negotiation process
differ signiﬁcantly across OECD economies to cause variations in the un-
employment rates. Wage bargaining models popularised by Blanchard
and Summers (1986) and McDonald and Solow (1981) are behind the
Eurosclerosis (Hardening of tissues) view of labour market rigidities.
These show how the unemployment rate is determined by the
bargaining of workers and ﬁrms over the wage rate and the level of em-
ployment that results from the interaction of demand for labour by
ﬁrms and preferences of the unions on wage rate and employment.
The union of workers actively engages to secure a higher wage rate
and employment for their members and incidentally create more un-
employment for non-union workers. Union member increase probabil-
ity of retaining job by raising the turnover cost, i.e. cost of hiring and
ﬁring and training, to employers while they care less about the pros-
pects of the non-union workers. Wage bargaining models of
Blanchﬂower and Oswald (1994), McDonald and Solow (1981);
Nickell and Quintini (2003); Krause et al. (2008a) and Faccini et al.
(2013) have been applied to explain persistency of unemployment
rates in EU economies with rigid labour markets. Growth rates are
lower because of Eurosclerosis.
Once estimated as above, the Phillips curve, aggregate supply and
Okun's curves can be applied to country speciﬁc stabilisation models
giving transition paths of growth, unemployment and inﬂation as
given in Appendix A.1. Inﬂation still can differ across countries under
discretion and policy rules as shown by a simple loss function
minimising inﬂation by regimes as shown in the Appendix A.2.Inﬂation equation Unemployment
equation
Coefﬁcients t-prob Coefﬁcients t-prob
Inﬂation (−1) 0.146 18.93 0.170 10.99
Inﬂation (−2) 0.135 6.168 −0.045 −2.94
Unemployment (−1) −0.139 −4.704 1.254 60.28
Unemployment (−2) 0.164 5.463 −0.335 −15.93
Constant 0.973 9.280 0.313 4.25
Tests
R2 0.273 0.898
F-statistic 198.7 4633.2
Log-Likelihood −4500 −3748
AIC 4.250 3.528
Swarz SC 4.24 3.54
Table 10
Parameters of the stabilisation model.
a b un gy ,n π1 π⁎ u1
values 1 1 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.06
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Variables in a VAR model are determined simultaneously and rely
more on historic patterns of data to establish relations between unem-
ployment and inﬂation than economic theories. VARmodels are becom-
ing popular because of big controversies on theories regarding
unemployment and inﬂation and violation of exogeneity assumption
contained in the single equation models estimated above. A simple
panel VAR model with two lags on inﬂation (πi , t) and unemployment
(ui , t) shows persistence of inﬂation and unemployment rates among
the OECD economies as shown by estimates in Table 9 generated by
VAR routines in Eviews. Here also the trade-offs between inﬂation and
unemployment are thin as shown by the impulse responses to shocks
either to inﬂation (e1,i ,t) and unemployment (e2,i ,t) as shown in Fig. 3.
Country speciﬁc VARmodels were estimated but could not be reported
due to space reasons, more details on these are also in Bhattarai (2008).
The short run trade-offs and impulse responses shown in Fig. 3 are com-
parable to Stock andWatson (2001, 2005); Mallick andMohsin (2010);
Cover and Mallick (2012) and Bhattarai and Mallick (2013). More ad-
vanced global VAR (GVAR) approach of Dees et al. (2007) could be ex-
plored in this context in future research.
πi;t ¼ β1;0πi;t−1 þ β1;1πi;t−2 þ β1;3ui;t−1 þ β1;4ui;t−2 þ e1;i;t ð13Þ
ui;t ¼ β2;0 þ β2;1πi;t−1 þ β2;2πi;t−2 þ β2;3ui;t−1 þ β2;4ui;t−2 þ e2;i;t ð14Þ
Let us explain the underlying causes for these VAR results. The inﬂa-
tion targeting policies adopted by most of the OECD countries have re-
duced variation in inﬂation in recent years. There are still wide
variations in unemployment rates. Enough statistical evidence exists
for the persistence hypothesis, either in linewith the theory of frictional
unemployment, insider–outsider hypothesis, efﬁciency wage theory,
job mismatch or lottery theory of unemployment or structural theory
of so called hysteresis and Eurosclerosis hypothesis. The estimates
from the vector autoregressive model of order two here are enough to
prove this persistence in unemployment rates among these countries
as presented in Table 9. Problem of such a VAR is that it cannot explain
the reason of unemployment at the ﬁrst place as the current unemploy-
ment rate depends only on its past values in the model. Initial starting
values, or historical accidents are important for suchmodels. Neverthe-
less when existing theories are unable to explain unemployment rates
or inﬂation rates, it is common for a researcher to turn to the time series
models for predicting the likely effects of supply or demand shocks
in unemployment rate and inﬂation, tracing out the marginal and cu-
mulative impacts of shocks over years as evidenced from the impulseTable 11
Time path of variables in the stabilisation model.
ut πt gy ,t gm ,t
q1 0.060 0.020 0.023 0.043
q2 0.055 0.025 0.035 0.06
q3 0.050 0.03 0.035 0.065
q4 0.045 0.035 0.035 0.070
q5 0.040 0.040 0.035 0.075
q6 0.040 0.040 0.03 0.07
q7 0.040 0.040 0.03 0.07
q8 0.060 0.020 0.01 0.03
q9 0.040 0.020 0.03 0.05
q10 0.040 0.020 0.03 0.05
q11 0.040 0.020 0.03 0.05response diagrams in Sims (1981) spirit of “let the data speak for them-
selves” (see also Holly andWeale (2000); Goodhart (1989)). Even here
the data generating processes can be very different among countries
giving different values of coefﬁcients in the VAR equations. Then even
unit shocks of same size generate signiﬁcantly different cumulative ef-
fects on unemployment rate and inﬂation across countries.
It might be helpful to apply the Beveridge curve of Pissarides (1985,
2000 and 2013) in process of explaining the equilibrium unemploy-
ment rates in an economy. In this theory dynamics of equilibrium un-
employment ( _u) is explained by transitional balance between the job
destruction (λ(1−u)) and job creation (θq(θ)u); _u = λ(1−u)−
θq(θ)u. In equilibrium unemployment results from a balance between
job destruction and creation as u ¼ λλþθqðθÞ. Thus the equilibrium unem-
ployment rate is determined by the inﬂow and outﬂow parameters of
employment shocks and the probability of the job ﬁnding ratios. Bever-
idge curves in Fig. 4 shows this equilibrium unemployment rates that
are consistent to vacancies fulﬁlling the general equilibrium process in
the economy. If the inﬂation is a proxy variable for vacancies (a point
that we believe is made the ﬁrst time in the literature here), then
above VAR results can in fact be another manifestation of a Beveridge
curve. Beneﬁt of connecting a Beveridge curve to VAR is obvious as
VAR results then can have micro interpretation. This is something that
can be explored more in further studies.
A recession pushes economy from a low unemployment equilibrium
point A to high unemployment equilibrium (u2) at point B in thisﬁgure;
more rigid labour market institutions cause massive mismatch and a
shift to point C with unemployment rate u2 despite with same vacancy
rate v1 as at point A with a lower unemployment rate u1 (see Bhattarai
and Dixon (2014) for more details on dynamics and micro-foundations
of this type). Equilibrium unemployment rate is higher when institu-
tions are less efﬁcient as at point C along BC2 than at point A along
BC1 even for the same level of vacancies, v1. Empirically when impulses
of unemployment and inﬂation shocks are signiﬁcant and wider they in
fact must be representing further shifts in the Beveridge curve indicat-
ing to larger changes in labourmarket institutions. Growth and redistri-
bution impacts of these changes can be signiﬁcant in addition to issues
of trade-offs between unemployment and inﬂation.4. Conclusions
Inﬂation and unemployment reduce welfare of individuals in an
economy and should be as low as possible. Persistency of high unem-
ployment rate across OECD countries during the era of greatmoderation
particularly after the economic crisis of 2008 and the subsequent reces-
sion requires a careful examination on evidences of the Phillips curve in
these economies tomeasure trade-offs between unemployment and in-
ﬂation. How much inﬂation occurs due to stimulation of aggregate de-
mand to reduce unemployment rate to its natural rate is a question
that still remains fundamental but controversial one in macroeconomic
policy debates.
This paper provides econometric evidence on empirical signiﬁcance
of Phillips curve in 28 out of 35 OECD countries separately and in the
panel of 40 advanced economies based on quarterly time series be-
tween 1990:1 to 2014:4. Such trade-offs weremore signiﬁcant in coun-
tries such Australia, Denmark, France, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, New
Zealand, the UK and the US. These trade-offs are still controversial as
no evidence for these were found in some other countries such as
Austria, Germany, Israel and Norway and even positive counter-
intuitive relations were found for Korea, Russian and Slovak Republic.
Thus there still is some empirical support to the policy irrelevance prop-
ositions under the rational expectation hypothesis. Thinness of the Phil-
lips curve is further complimented by coefﬁcients of short run aggregate
supply functions thatwere signiﬁcant for only in three countries and the
coefﬁcients of Okun curve for growth on unemployment were signiﬁ-
cant only in 13 of these countries.
Fig. 3. Impulse responses to inﬂation and unemployment shocks.
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between job creation and destruction processes, reductions in unem-
ployment rates require complementing macro stimulations by
microeconomic structural and institutional reforms. These include con-
taining the mark up power of ﬁrms and unions over and above the cost
of production and marginal productivity of labour, anchoring expected
inﬂation to the steady growth rate of the economy, less stringent laws
on the minimum wage rate or for insider–outsider or efﬁciency wage
bargaining and on rules regarding hiring and ﬁring. Reducing real and
nominal frictions or rigidities in this manner shifts Phillips or Beveridge
curves towards left, making economic growth possible with low inﬂa-
tion and low unemployment rates with more dynamic and ﬂexible
labour markets.
The classical, frictional unemployment, insider–outsider, creative
destruction or the efﬁciency wage theories of unemployment
are more relevant in explaining country speciﬁc differences inFig. 4. Equilibrium unemployment and labour market institutions: Beveridge curve.unemployment rates. Countries with more liberal markets and macro-
economic ﬂexibility as the US and the UK have signiﬁcantly lower un-
employment rates than countries with more rigid labour markets such
as France, Italy and Spain. Countries that made labour market more
microeconomically ﬂexible, such as Germany, have reduced unemploy-
ment rates signiﬁcantly. Effective labour market policies require in-
creased ﬂow of information between employers and employees,
transparency in employment rules and regulations, reforms in the
transfer and beneﬁt system and credibility in economic policy. Training
and education programme geared towards innovations and productivi-
ty, matching of job between employers and employees, reduction in the
cost of job or employee, search bymeans of job data banks can bring ef-
ﬁciency in the labour market and reduce the rate of unemployment.
Stimulus and supply side reforms should go hand in hand to bring
down the unemployment rate to its minimum.
Appendix A
A.1. Macroeconomic stabilisation model of unemployment–inﬂation
trade-offs
The basic mechanism of stabilisation programme can be explained
by a simple model using the Phillips and Okun curves along with the
and the growth rate of money supply (gm ,t) equation. Unemployment
and output gap by Okun's law are related as:
ut−un ¼−a gy;t−gy;n
 	
ðA:1Þ
where gy ,n is natural growth rates of output and un is natural rate
of unemployment. Inﬂation (πt) and unemployment linked by the
expectation augmented Phillips curve as:
πt−πt−1 ¼−b ut−ut−1ð Þ: ðA:2Þ
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gm;t ¼ gy;t þ πt ðA:3Þ
where gy ,t is the actual growth rate of output; gy ,n the natural growth
rate of output, gm ,t the growth rate of money supply, πt the actual inﬂa-
tion rate; π⁎ the target inﬂation rate; ut the actual unemployment rate
and un the natural rate of unemployment.
Consider an economy with a unemployment rate (ut) at 0.06% and
the growth rate (gy ,t) is 0.023%. Let the government aim to reduce the
unemployment rate by 0.5% each quarter until it reaches the natural un-
employment rate of 4% by using the expansionarymonetary policy. This
stabilisation programmecauses rise in the inﬂation rate above the target
rate of 2% because of expansionary policies. Exit strategy from such ex-
pansionary policy is to adopt a contractionary inﬂation reduction policy
in which inﬂation is reduced by 2% each quarter. Let that start after one
quarter of getting the unemployment target at 4%. Unemployment
returns to its natural level after price is stabilised. Let us ﬁnd implica-
tions of these policies, given above parameters, on the time path of ut,
πt, gy ,t and gm ,t. For this ﬁrst calculate inﬂation for q2 as:
π2 ¼ π1−b u2−u1ð Þ ¼ 0:02−1 0:055−0:06ð Þ ¼ 0:02þ 0:005 ¼ 0:025:
Unemployment in quarter 8:
u8 ¼ π8−π7−1 þ u7 ¼ 0:02þ 0:04 ¼ 0:06:
Calculate the growth rate from the Okun's curve for q2 as:
g2 ¼
u2−u1
−1
þ gn ¼ 0:005þ 0:03 ¼ 0:035
g8 ¼
u8−u7
−1
þ gn ¼−0:02þ 0:03 ¼ 0:01:
Then for growth rate of money supply gm , t=gy , t+πtgm ,2=
gy ,2+π2=0.025+0.035=0.06. Continue like this and put results in
the table as:
In steady state growth rate of money gm ,t equals 5% with 2% target
inﬂation (π⁎) and 3% natural growth rate of the economy (gy ,n) and
natural rate of unemployment (un) at 4%. In this way there should be
a short run trade-off between inﬂation and unemployment as shown
by the empirical evidences in country speciﬁc and panel regressions
analyses in Section 3.
A.2. Inﬂation in policy rule versus optimal discretion
Inﬂation targets are easily achieved when policy makers adopt a
policy rule rather than when they are given a discretion. This is a prob-
lem of minimising a loss function subject to the aggregate supply con-
straint as:
Min
π
S πð Þ ¼ b y−yð Þ þ aπ2; a N 0 b N 0: ðA:4Þ
Subject to
y ¼ y þ c E πð Þ−πð Þ; c N 0 ðA:5Þ
where y is actual output y⁎ is the natural level of output and (y−y⁎) is
the output gap and π is the actual inﬂation rate.
Inserting this constraint into the objective function this constrained
minimisation problem reduces to a single equation as:
Min
π
S πð Þ ¼ bc E πð Þ−πð Þ þ aπ2: ðA:6ÞIf policy makers stick to a policy rule; people know this, actual inﬂa-
tion equals expected inﬂation, π=E(π)=0.
∵π ¼ E πð Þ; y ¼ y S πð Þ ¼ aπ2 ; ∂S
∂π
¼ 2aπ ¼ 0⇒ πp ¼ 0: ðA:7Þ
No inﬂation would be optimal with this policy rule. Under discre-
tionary rule, the actual inﬂation is different from the expected inﬂation,
π≠E(π).
Min
π
S πð Þ ¼ bc E πð Þ−πð Þ þ aπ2
∂S
∂π
¼−bcþ 2aπ ¼ 0; π ¼ bc
2a
N 0;
∂2S
∂π2
¼ 2a N 0
ðA:8Þ
Thus the actual inﬂation under the discretion is higher than under
the policy rule, πdNπp. This is the argument behind the policy based
rules for the central banks and government around the world in recent
years (Kydland and Prescott, 1977; Bean, 1994 and Svensson, 1997).
Again reducing unemployment should come from structural and insti-
tutional reforms of the labour market not from a discretionary ﬁscal
policy.
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